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Lebanon and the Syrian crisis. 





The article takes its point of departure in the recent political turmoil in Lebanon, where the 
crisis in neighbouring Syria is influencing the conflict between the two main political 
alliances in Lebanese politics, March 8 and March 14. The presidential election, which is 
going to take place in 2014 – and which used to be a thing decided in Damascus – has 
become an important theme in the fragile situation in Lebanon, not the least because it is 
completely impossible to foresee how the war in Syria will end. The sensitive situation is 
deepened by the apparent fact that both sides in Lebanon, Hezbollah as well as the Future 
Movement alliance, are sending men and weapons into Syria. Furthermore the internal 
problems in Lebanon are influenced by the almost 800.000 Syrian refugees having fled to 
Lebanon. The potential regional and international repercussions are significant: both the US 
and the EU are having trouble dealing with the complex situation in Lebanon, where both 
March 8 and March 14 parliamentarians supposedly will be relevant negotiation partners 
beyond a possible post-Assad scenario. 
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The Lebanese President Michel Sleiman’s six-year-term expires in May 2014. 
The level of consensus among the rival politicians in Lebanon concerning the 
upcoming election is at a very low point, as the political crisis in Lebanon 
continues. The National Dialogue Committee, comprising of Lebanon’s main 
political leaders including March 8 and March 14 Ministers, hasn’t held regular 
meetings since September 2012. The political unrest is a result of deep national 
divisions over the ongoing war in neighbouring Syria, recently becoming more 
tense following Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s critique of Lebanon’s self-
disassociation policy in an interview with a Lebanese TV-station in October 
2013: “Lebanon contributed directly in igniting the flames inside Syria by 
allowing terrorists to cross in through the Lebanese-Syrian borders so 
practically there was no self-disassociation”. 
 
There is hardly doubt that both sides in Lebanon, Hezbollah as well as the 
Future Movement coalition, are sending men and weapons into Syria. The 
Hezbollah fighters are in armed confrontation with Sunni jihadists in Syria and 
the fear in Lebanon is that spillovers will result in a situation, where the 
fighting will take place in Lebanon as well. There have been clashes between 
supporters and opponents of al-Assad in the northern city of Tripoli causing 
dozens of victims and hundreds of wounded.1 So far the Lebanese Army has 
been able to contain the confrontations, but the fear is, that the unrest will 
spread to other areas in Lebanon including Beirut, where several car bombs 
have exploded and minor clashes have occured. The caretaker government has 
drafted a security plan, but security forces will hardly be able to control things, 
if a further escalation of the conflict internally in Lebanon becomes a reality. 
 
A much discussed issue has been the case of former Minister Michel Samada, 
charged in coordination with Syrian officials of being responsible for smuggling 
of explosives into Lebanon for the purpose of making car bombs. Samada was 
arrested by the Lebanese authorities in August 2012 and allegedly he during the 
interrogation admitted involvement in the conspiracy. Shortly after this the 
leader of the al-Maloumat (Lebanese Internal Security Forces), Wissam al-
Hassan, was killed by a car bomb. The assassination was seen as a warning to 
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people in Lebanon who might attempt to support the fight against the regime in 
Damascus, but the connection was never officially established. Earlier Hassan 
had been leading the investigation concerning former Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri's death in February 2005, so apparently there was also a more direct 
address label attached to the bomb.2 According to rumours Hassan had 
supported the Syrian opposition in the Syrian war by facilitating a flow of 
money and arms to the Syrian opposition through Lebanon. He was given a 
state funeral ceremony, posthumously awarded the National Order of the 
Cedar by the President and laid to rest alongside Hariri.3 
 
The National Dialogue has attempted to touch the sensitive issue of disarming 
the Hezbollah and in September 2012 Sleiman suggested a national defense 
strategy according to which it would be possible for the Hezbollah to maintain 
their armed forces, but in a changed setup so that they were under the 
command of the Lebanese army, which then (at least in principle) would be 
able to claim the monopoly of legitimate violence. The discussion related to the 
proposal has revolved around if it would be possible to make such an 
arrangement without handing over the weapons to the army (supported by 14 
March) or if a more informal coordination between the Hezbollah “resistance” 
and the Lebanese would do (supported by 8 March). Hezbollah-leader Hassan 
Nasrallah mentioned in an Iftar speech in July 2013 that “We are always ready 
to attend National Dialogue or any dialogue to discuss a national defense 
strategy before the formation of a Cabinet or after its formation”. He also 
warned 14 March supporters about pursuing an unrealistic scenario, where the 
Hezbollah would hand over their arms to the Lebanese army. 
 
The Syrian crisis and Lebanon 
A Weberian approach can be useful, if one wants to understand the increasing 
social and political tension in Lebanon in light of the Syrian crisis. A simplified 
dichotomy, where on one side we have representatives for a legitimate, weak 
Lebanese government and on the other side proxies for Syria and Iran, might 
work in some leightweight Western media, but the Lebanese reality is more 
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complex. A dual-power situation in Lebanese politics is in the actual reality 
supplemented by a dual-legitimacy phenomenon, where the Hezbollah, with its 
efficient political work in parliament, munipalities etc., its notoriously well-
functioning and wide-scaled social work and its ideological campaigns aimed at 
the Lebanese public sphere through the rhetoric of Nasrallah and the 
impressive satellite and internet based news-hub Al Manar, is able strongly to 
influence Lebanese politics and society.4 
 
The recent conflict is deepened by the fact that almost 800.000 Syrian refugees 
have fled to Lebanon (according to UNHCR, Oct. 2013).5 The conflict-potential 
related to this reality is significant, not the least because of the above mentioned 
national divisions. There is no consensus in Lebanese society regarding how the 
refugees should be dealt with. Some are worried about to which degree they 
will constitute a drain on the limited Lebanese resources. But more importantly: 
others fear that an influx of highly problematic groups will hide among the 
fleeing Syrians. Lebanon is a sensitive country when it comes to refugees, not 
the least because of the more than 400.000 Palestinian refugees, who according 
to UNRWA are to be found in Lebanon and who for decades have contributed 
to the recent dramatic Lebanese history. 
 
International Dimensions 
The dual legitimacy phenomenon in Lebanon has for years been an obstacle for 
the EU in the sense that the EU has had difficulties dealing with an entity like 
Hezbollah: its sharing of power with other actors in Lebanon, its social work, its 
maintaining a status as “the resistance“ and at the same time its pursuing 
political agendas on behalf of Syria and Iran. In July 2013 the EU added the 
Hezbollah Military Wing to the EU’s list of entities, groups and persons 
involved in terrorist acts. In the EU press announcement it was emphasized, 
that “this decision does not affect the continuation of dialogue with all political 
parties in Lebanon and does not affect the delivery of assistance to Lebanon.”6 
By explicitly limiting the listing to the armed wing, the EU wanted to maintain 
working relations with Lebanon's government and political parties. Obviously, 
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however, the decision may complicate the EU’s ability to approach Lebanese 
politicians with relations to Hezbollah. 
 
In a comment to the EU decision US Secretary of State John Kerry stated that a 
“growing number of governments are recognizing Hezbollah as the dangerous 
and destabilizing terrorist organization that it is.”7 This approach based on a 
simple dual-power understanding of the Lebanese realities might not, given the 
recent highly problematic situation in Syria and its effects on Lebanon, be 
appropriate. For two reasons: if the interest is to avoid a spreading of the Syrian 
tragedy by maintaining a dialogue with all parties, a pragmatic approach where 
contact is maintained to both March 8 and March 14 seems necessary. And 
added to that: a post-Assad situation in Syria might create a highly critical and 
unstable situation in Lebanon. Given such a scenario it seems reasonable to be 
ready and able to negotiate solutions with all parties interested in avoiding 
chaos. Lebanese March 8 might as well as March 14 parliamentarians be 
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